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Total Decontamination Cost of the Anthrax
Letter Attacks
Ketra Schmitt and Nicholas A. Zacchia
All of the costs associated with decontamination following the 2001 anthrax letter attacks were summarized, estimated,
and aggregated based on existing literature and news media reports. A comprehensive list of all affected structures was
compiled. Costs were analyzed by building class and decontamination type. Sampling costs and costs of worker relocation
were also included. Our analysis indicates that the total cost associated with decontamination was about $320 million.
In September and October of 2001, 7 letters con-taining Bacillus anthracis (ie, anthrax) were sent to po-
litical and media targets throughout the eastern United
States.1 The event was the first of its kind, and remediation
efforts took years. Previous studies have addressed the po-
tential cost of a large-scale anthrax attack, indicating the
possibility for devastating decontamination costs.2,3 How-
ever, no complete accounting of decontamination costs
associated with the anthrax letter attacks exists.
This is the first of a series of articles aimed at estimating the
total economic impact of the anthrax letter attacks, and the
focus of this article is solely on decontamination. Establishing
the total costs associated with decontamination is especially
difficult given the scarcity of data surrounding the events.
Nevertheless, understanding the costs of this decontamina-
tion effort is important for informing decisions on antiter-
rorism policy and for developing decontamination policies
for future bioterror events. This article serves to bridge the
current knowledge gap by quantifying the costs specifically
associated with the decontamination efforts necessitated by
the anthrax letter attacks, commonly referred to by their U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) case name, Amerithrax.
Decontamination took many forms at the various sites
and included extensive sampling. Areas producing positive
samples were cleaned and resampled. In some cases, sensi-
tive or important items were taken offsite and cleaned using
nondestructive methods such as chlorine dioxide gas, eth-
ylene oxide, and irradiation.4,5 Irradiation is an effective
decontamination technique; however, it is expensive and
can damage some materials, including electronics. Other
sites were cleaned with bleach, liquid chlorine dioxide, an
antimicrobial pesticide, or Sandia foam.4 These wet
methods disinfect surfaces through a number of biological
and/or chemical processes. The efficacy of a particular
chemical depends on the surface to which it is applied, the
concentration of anthrax spores, and the time period over
which it is left on a surface. Large or highly contaminated
sites were fumigated with chlorine gas, vaporized hydrogen
peroxide, or paraformaldehyde. These are vaporous meth-
ods in which gas is released in a confined space to decon-
taminate material that cannot be cleaned by other methods,
such as porous materials or materials sensitive to wet
methods. Vaporous methods were also used when large
volumes needed to be decontaminated. Finally, HEPA
vacuuming was used to remove spores without re-releasing,
since HEPA filters have openings smaller than the smallest
anthrax spore.4 These are all of the decontamination
techniques employed following the anthrax letter attacks.
In 2001, significant uncertainty existed regarding decon-
tamination efficacy and/or safety for all of these contaminants.
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Subsequently, EPA conducted benchmark testing and issued
crisis exemptions for their use during the Amerithrax events.
In this article we focus solely on the Amerithrax events
and attempts to estimate total costs of the associated de-
contamination. The results from this work can be used to
inform cost models that pertain to future, potentially larger
attacks; however, the goal of this article is solely to assess
costs from this single historical event. Understanding the
costs associated with the anthrax letter attacks is important
for policymakers and government agencies to be able to
effectively plan for future events. It is clear that extrapo-
lating from the anthrax letter events to future bioterror
events will be difficult; decontamination costs stemmed
from the particularities of the attack and the affected
businesses. In particular, the United States Postal Service
(USPS) and office workers (including those on Capitol
Hill) can fairly easily move operations to another site, but
other types of businesses are less flexible and may not be
able to function during a closure.
We aggregate decontamination costs in order to con-
struct an overall estimate. The results of this and subse-
quent research will form the basis of a comparison of costs
associated with the Amerithrax events and the policy re-
sponses to those events. Since the anthrax letter attacks
presented novel decontamination challenges, much of the
subsequent work relied on learning and developing specific
decontamination experience and knowledge. Therefore,
results can be used to assess the relative costs of decon-
tamination methods and to test whether learning or econ-
omies of scale occurred.
Methodology
Because of our interest in the policy implications of the
Amerithrax events, we chose to use the higher cost estimates
when equally valid, competing estimates exist. Using the
higher estimate provides a best case for the value of the policy
intervention, the ultimate goal of this series of articles.
The literature includes a variety of methodological
frameworks to estimate the economic impact of a terrorist
event, including input-output (I-O), computable general
equilibrium models (CGE), and modifications of both to
estimate lost productivity and incorporate behavioral im-
pacts.6-8 Several articles have evaluated aspects of decon-
tamination costs following the Amerithrax events.9-11AU1c A
National Academies panel reviewed the events and used
these to suggest future protocols for reopening facilities as
well as policy improvements for developing and main-
taining up-to-date decontamination standards.12 These
efforts are an important part of understanding the potential
for avoided costs in developing antiterrorism policy. When
creating estimates of past economic harm, however, a first
step is to understand exactly what direct costs occurred.
This article seeks to do just that for the decontamination
costs associated with the Amerithrax events.
We developed the following approach for determining
these costs. First, we determined, by consulting government
and news reports, which buildings were contaminated and
what type of remediation was used. We cross-checked
building names by address to eliminate double counting.
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) compiled
contracting data for decontamination on Capitol Hill,
which was a particularly important resource for this and
subsequent steps. Next, we compiled existing cost estimates
as reported in government documents and news reports.
We next contacted affected parties for specific decontami-
nation and cost information. We then contacted GAO to
request background information on buildings for which
more data was required.
No nongovernment parties responded to our requests for
information, and GAO record retention policies are such
that data are no longer available beyond their published
reports. Thus, no cost estimates were located for a number
of buildings. Therefore, we constructed cost estimates by
using existing data. We also used this method to compare
costs between buildings for which data were available. For
both missing data and comparison purposes, we applied
learning factors from the literature. We calculated cost es-
timates on a per building basis and discussed the merits and
drawbacks of calculating costs on a square footage basis.
A key challenge in this research was identifying reliable
data. We define reliable data as data that can be verified in
more than 1 source. Where multiple estimates exist, we
picked the most recent source, the source from a peer-
reviewed journal, GAO report, or court testimony.
Data
bT1Tables 1 and bT22 contain a complete list of contaminated
buildings. Table 1 lists 7 fumigated buildings, and Table 2
lists 35 nonfumigated buildings. Decontamination cost
estimates were available for 6 fumigated buildings, 1 non-
fumigated building, and an aggregate cost for 6 non-
fumigated buildings located on Capitol Hill. These costs
varied from $0.5 million to $130 million for fumigated
buildings and $1.8 million to $15 million for non-
fumigated buildings. (All costs are given in 2001 US dol-
lars.) Both the average cost and standard deviation in cost
were roughly an order of magnitude smaller for non-
fumigated buildings (mean of $3.9 million and standard
deviation of $4.9 million) versus a mean of $38 million
and standard deviation of $52 million for fumigated
buildings. Note that the standard deviation is larger than
the mean in both categories. Costs for both classes are
clearly heterogeneous.
We also explored the data on a cost per square foot basis.
We were able to identify square footage for 11 buildings
and estimate area for 2 remaining buildings based on the
area of geographically similar buildings. For the 11 build-
ings for which area data were available, the mean building
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size was 23 million square feet, and the standard deviation
was 41 million square feet. While the sizes of the entire
buildings are available, no data exist on the size of the area
contaminated at each building. In some cases, it appears
that most of the building was treated. In others, however,
decontamination efforts were restricted to small areas of
the building.
For fumigated buildings, estimating on a volume basis
is feasible since the entire facility was fumigated in 5 out of
7 cases. Only the Hart Building and the Department
of Justice mail facility had less than building-wide fumi-
gation. In contrast, for nonfumigated buildings, the area(s)
contaminated dictated how much remediation had to be
done and generally how long it took.10,13 The correlation
between cleaning time and cleaning cost suggests that
buildings that showed low contamination (1 or 2 positive
samples) and were cleaned within a short time period (24
to 48 hours) were less costly to clean than buildings that
showed dozens of positive samples and took weeks or
months to clean.10,13 Since the actual areas that were de-
contaminated are not available, there is little utility in
considering decontamination efforts on an area basis; thus,
estimates were based on per building cost.
Identification of Buildings Remediated
Based on our review, at least 42 buildings had some
contamination. No source found listed all contaminated
buildings, and identifying unique contamination sites was
complicated by the fact that at least 5 buildings are re-
ferred to by different names in different documents or
simply by their location. When a building appears in the
literature under different names, it is listed in the tables
with an ‘‘aka’’ in parentheses. A comprehensive list of all
buildings believed to have been contaminated is provided
in Tables 1 and 2.
While testing was performed at 26 buildings around
Capitol Hill, remediation was undertaken at just 7 loca-
tions: the P Street Warehouse, the Supreme Court Build-
ing, the Dirksen Building, the Ford Building, the Hart
Building, the Longworth Building, and the Russell Build-
ing.4 The Department of Justice (DOJ) Mail Facility was
also heavily remediated.5 Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) documents and news reports indicate
that an additional 3 government facilities provided at least 1
positive sample: the Walter Reed Complex; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; and the Washington, DC,
Veterans Affairs Medical Center.14 Our search of published
CDC documents turned up no reports on either decon-
tamination activities or costs for each location. Press reports
from that time indicate that contamination at these facili-
ties was extremely low. For example, a single detected spore
was reported at the Walter Reed Complex.15,16 From these
reports, as well as the lack of documentation from gov-
ernment agencies, we infer that the scale of contamination
and remediation at these sites was minimal and done at
minimal cost.
Further, a majority of contaminated USPS buildings
required only minimal decontamination.10 Published
Table 1. Fumigated Buildings Including Fumigation Type, Building Volume, and Total Cost per Affected Building
Building
Volume
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1,40019 Vaporized hydrogen
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7,00019 Chlorine dioxide Entire facility $70,0002,19 $10.00
U.S. Department of
Justice Mail Facility (aka
Landover)
8.319 Para-formaldehyde Area around 2 mail
sorting machines
$4645 $55.90
AMI building 67019 Chlorine dioxide Entire facility $5,00012 $7.46
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Table 2. Identification of Nonfumigated Buildings with Occupant Type and Square Footage
Nonfumigated Buildings Occupant Location Area (ft2)
West Palm Beach Post Office PDC USPS 3200 Summit Blvd., West Palm Beach, FL 185,000
Blue Lake Post Office USPS 4560 Communication Ave., Suite 100, Boca Raton, FL
Boca Raton Post Office USPS 301 S. Federal Hwy., Boca Raton, FL
Greenacres Post Office USPS 4300 S. Jog Rd., Greenacres, FL 30,661
Lake Worth Post Office USPS 4151 Lake Worth Rd., Lake Worth, FL 19,682
Lucerne Post Office USPS 720 Lucerne Ave., Lake Worth, FL 11,590
Jackson Main Post Office USPS 4396 Lafayette St., Marianna, FL
Princeton Post Office USPS 213 Carnegie Ctr., Princeton, NJ
Princeton-Palmer Square Station
Post Office
USPS 20 Palmer Square East, Princeton, NJ 920
Rocky Hill Post Office USPS 130 Washington ST., Rocky Hill, NJ 4,150
Southern NJ PDC USPS 501 Benigno Blvd., Bellmawr, NJ 375,500
Trenton Station E Post Office USPS 20 S. Montgomery S., Trenton, NJ
Dulles Post Office USPS Near Washington Dulles International Airport 119,144
Friendship Station Post Office USPS 4005 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20016 26,133
Pentagon Station Post Office USPS 3118 Washington Blvd., Arlington, VA 33,774
Raleigh PDC USPS 1 Floretta Pl., Raleigh, NC 386,506
Southwest Station Post Office USPS 45 L St., SW, Washington, DC
Morgan Station PDC USPS 341 Ninth Ave., New York, NY 2,100,000
Indianapolis Critical Parts Center
& Repair Facility
USPS Near Indianapolis International Airport 72,000
Kansas City Stamp Fulfillment Services USPS 8300 Underground Dr., Pillar 210, Kansas City, MO 300,000
Southern Connecticut P&DC
(aka Wallingford PDC)
USPS 24 Research Parkway, Wallingford, CT 350,000
P Street Warehouse Capitol Hill Located on P St., Washington, DC
Supreme Court Building Capitol Hill Corner of 1st St., NE, and East Capitol St., NE, Washington, DC
Dirksen Building Capitol Hill Corner of 1st St., NE, and Constitution Ave., NE, Washington, DC 750,520
Ford Building Capitol Hill Corner of D St., SW, and 2nd St., SW, Washington, DC 594,966
Longworth Building Capitol Hill Corner of C St., SE, and S. Capitol St., SW, Washington, DC 702,608
Russell Building Capitol Hill Corner of Delaware Ave., NE, and Constitution Ave., NE, Washington, DC 698,921
Kuser Road Office Building Corporate Office Kuser Rd., Hamilton, NJ
NBC Nightly News Office Corporate Office 30 Rockefeller Plaza, #701, New York, NY
CBS News Office Corporate Office 524 W. 57th St., New York, NY
ABC News Office Corporate Office 100 W. 43rd St., New York, NY
New York Post Office Corporate Office 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY
Walter Reed Complex Government Mail Facility 6900 Georgia Ave., NW, # 77, Washington, DC
Washington, DC, Veterans Affairs
Medical Center
Government Mail Facility 50 Irving St., NW, Washington, DC
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms
Government Mail Facility 99 New York Ave., NE, Washington, DC
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reports indicate that either the U.S. General Services Ad-
ministration (GSA) Building 410 in Anacostia or the post
office in the Anacostia Naval Yard were decontami-
nated.14,17 This is the only case where definitive data on
building identity were not found. We assume these are the
same building and treat them as such in our cost model.
Additionally, 6 corporate offices were found to have
been contaminated with some amount of anthrax. These
include the offices of NBC Nightly News, CBS News,
ABC News, the New York Post, and American Media,
Inc. (AMI). The sixth office building was the Kuser Road
office building, likely exposed through cross-contami-
nated mail that resulted in 1 case of cutaneous anthrax.18
No cost data are available for these buildings, with the
exception of the cleanup costs at the AMI building,
which was self-reported by the company that did the
remediation. None of the companies above responded to
our requests for data.
Twenty-three buildings produced positive environmen-
tal samples at USPS facilities.13 At least 3 large Processing
and Distribution Centers (PDCs) required extensive de-
contamination. Two of these, Brentwood and Trenton,
required total fumigation because of evidence of aerosol-
ization of anthrax spores. Costs for these 2 buildings were
very high. A third PDC, Morgan Station, required more
extensive and costly cleanup. The USPS reported 20 other
buildings that tested positive for anthrax spores but gen-
erally had low levels of contamination, mainly through the
handling of cross-contaminated letters. For many of these
sites, ‘‘cleanup procedures were very limited, ’’ with reme-
diation restricted to disposal of a few contaminated items or
treatment with a bleach solution of the area(s) that pro-
duced a positive sample.10,13 Fourteen of these USPS sites
produced only 1 positive sample.13 (For a comprehensive
list of contaminated USPS sites and remediation work
done, see reference 13.)
Fumigated Buildings
Reliable cost estimates for total decontamination efforts
were found for 6 of the 7 fumigated buildings—all but
GSA Building 410. Decontamination at these buildings
involved partial to full fumigation, sampling both to as-
certain the extent of decontamination and the effective-
ness of fumigation, as well as removal and disposal of
materials, surface cleaning, and the technical and admin-
istrative costs associated with these activities. No source
was found that differentiated specifically between costs
associated with fumigation versus costs associated with
other types of remediation. The most detailed costing in
the literature relies on contracts awarded to companies
that used combinations of the remediation techniques
listed above.4,5
Table 1 shows cost estimates for fumigated buildings on
a volume basis. It shows that the Hart Building was the
most expensive to fumigate per cubic foot if we divide total
costs by area fumigated. However, much of the remediation
at this site did not involve fumigation. As there are no
records detailing the exact area contaminated, we assume
that contamination was restricted to fumigated areas, which
skews the cost per square foot since more than just the
fumigated space was cleaned. The Hart Building was also
the first to be fumigated and incurred high technical and
support costs because no project of this type had ever been
attempted. Additionally, one of the remediation goals was
to open the facility as quickly as possible; therefore, work
was conducted on a 24-hour basis.19 The National Aca-
demies report states that the response on Capitol Hill was
‘‘uncoordinated, and it was marked by inconsistencies,’’
which may partially explain the elevated costs.12(p68) A
separate report, produced by the Government Account-
ability Office, found that while many uncertainties existed,
the EPA ‘‘used its contracting capabilities effectively.’’4(p4)
As GAO commended EPA on their contracting, the extra
costs may have resulted from developing novel response
protocols. Experience gained at this site may have helped
guide the decontamination of other facilities, since many of
the same companies contracted to do the cleanup here were
involved in later cleanups elsewhere. ‘‘Remediation of the
AMI and NBC buildings was done by private companies;
EPA led the remediation effort in the Capitol and USPS
buildings.’’12(p56)
Likewise, the costs for fumigating the DOJ Mail Facility
appear high because at this site only a small volume around
2 mail sorting machines was fumigated, while the rest of the
building was remediated using more conventional meth-
ods. The total costs including other types of decontami-
nation are included in the sum, which is averaged over the
small volume that was actually fumigated.
The DOJ mail handled cross-contaminated letters and
had to be remediated. Work included cleaning with a
bleach solution, disposal and incineration of nonessen-
tial porous items, decontamination of essential items and
documents with ethylene oxide, and the fumigation of 2
mail sorting machines with paraformaldehyde, a total vol-
ume of about 8,000 cubic feet.5 Remediation was involved
and took about 2.5 months. Canter et al determined the
total remediation cost of the site to be $460,000.5 The DOJ
Mail Facility was closed for 4.5 months, during which time
normal activities were moved elsewhere, incurring an ad-
ditional cost of $250,000.5 Total cost for this extensive
cleanup (involving fumigation), building closure, and re-
location was $720,000, with over one-third of that cost due
to relocating.
The other fumigated facilities were cleaned at a slower
pace and benefited from previous experience with anthrax
decontamination.20 Cost per cubic foot for these buildings
was much lower. From values for remediation costs and
volume fumigated in Table 1, the price per cubic foot of
fumigating with chlorine dioxide was between $7.50 and
$10.00, while fumigation with vaporized hydrogen perox-
ide cost about $6.00 per cubic foot.
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Nonfumigated Buildings
Table 2 shows all nonfumigated buildings: 21 USPS
buildings, 6 Capitol Hill buildings, 5 corporate office
buildings, and 3 government mail facilities. Existing data
on nonfumigated buildings includes $15 million for the
Morgan PDC and a total cost of $2.1 million for 6 Capitol
Hill buildings. Since the entire facilities were not decon-
taminated, considering data on a per square foot basis does
not make sense. For these buildings, per square foot costs
are $7.14 and $3.10, respectively. The high variance be-
tween these can be explained by several factors; most sig-
nificant is the lack of knowledge about the actual area
decontaminated.
Capitol Hill Buildings
Collectively the cost of remediating the buildings on Ca-
pitol Hill was about $27 million.4 These buildings are
discussed separately from all others for a number of reasons.
First, detailed contractual information is available for these
buildings. More important, the cleanup cost for Capitol
Hill buildings is likely significantly higher than it was for
other comparable sites. The National Academies Board on
Life Sciences conjectured that ‘‘[t]he high-profile users of
the buildings undoubtedly created pressure to reopen the
buildings quickly, yet a conservative definition of ‘clean’
was adopted by EPA. More important, there was a lack of a
standard protocol to drive remediation, which in some
cases led to repeated decontamination.’’12(p66)
Office buildings on Capitol Hill were reopened in a
matter of 3 months, whereas some large USPS PDCs stayed
closed for years. The standard for anthrax removal was
initially considered to be ‘‘no detectable, viable anthrax
spores.’’4(p8) As this is not possible to demonstrate, the EPA
set the standard as ‘‘zero B. anthracis growth on any samples
taken’’ and ‘‘[t]o ensure credibility, EPA took a large
number of samples,’’ more than 9,000.12(p67) By compar-
ison, USPS took about 10,000 samples in total for its 23
contaminated buildings as well as the 286 other buildings it
sampled.21 This difference demonstrates an exacting stan-
dard of cleanup exercised on Capitol Hill.
In addition to the large number of samples taken on
Capitol Hill, the comparatively quick turnaround, 24/7
cleanup schedule, media quotes, and public addresses as-
suring the public that they were safe, as well as the act of
taking nasal swabs from anyone in the region who re-
quested one, all demonstrate that more effort went toward
remediating the Capitol Hill buildings.4,12 Nasal swabs are
a particularly good indication that extra care was taken on
Capitol Hill, primarily because they were already known to
have no diagnostic value and their function in the Capitol
Hill cleanup was largely to ‘‘.convey[ed] the message that
the hazard that building occupants might face was being
taken seriously.’’12(p68) Comments made by a Capitol Po-
lice spokesman illustrate the prevailing sentiment: ‘‘It cost
what it cost. The bottom line is we have to ensure the public
safety.’’22
The only Capitol Hill facility fumigated was the Hart
Senate Office Building, costing at least $14.3 million, ap-
proximately half of the $27 million Capitol Hill clean-
up.4,22 Therefore, each of the remaining 6 Capitol Hill sites
cost about $2.1 million to decontaminate. At the Capitol
Hill sites, technical contracts accounted for over 26% of
total costs for nonfumigated buildings, while ‘‘technical
contracts typically account for about 10 percent of total
contract costs at a cleanup site.’’4(p15)
Corporate Office Buildings
Corporate buildings affected by the Amerithrax attack in-
cluded the offices of NBC Nightly News, CBS News, ABC
News, the New York Post, and American Media, Inc., as
well as an office building on Kuser Road, exposed through
cross-contamination.18 Of these buildings, the American
Media, Inc., building, which housed the National Enquirer
newspaper office, was the most contaminated. The owners
of the building decided simply to move and sold the
building for $40,000 to Sabre Technical Services, a com-
pany that was involved in remediation at USPS facilities.23
According to a Sabre spokesperson, the building cost
‘‘significantly less than 5 million dollars’’ to decontaminate
and they were able to sell it in 2007 for $9.3 million.12,24
Details about the remediation done at this building were
not released, and it is important to remember that Sabre
Technical Services was the only stakeholder in this opera-
tion, likely expediting the decontamination effort. How-
ever, from this we can say that it is at least feasible to
decontaminate a building like this for under $5 million.
This value results in a fumigation cost of $7.70 per cubic
foot. This is lower than the $9 to $10 per cubic foot for the
Trenton and Brentwood PDCs and validates the idea that
remediation (at least in theory) became easier and cheaper
over time.
The offices of NBCNightly News, CBSNews, ABCNews,
and the New York Post were all contaminated; however, little
public information is available on the extent of contamination
or the cost of cleanup. Inquiries into the subject received no
response. None of these sites showed evidence of aerosolized
anthrax, nor were there any cases of inhalation anthrax asso-
ciated with these sites. However, contamination seems not to
have been localized. At NBC there were 3 areas contaminated
by anthrax spores. They included the set of NBC Nightly
News, a security room, and the mail room.12 Ensuring the
safety of employees and earning their confidence seemed im-
portant at least to NBC, whose ‘‘management went over-
board’’ with the standards they set themselves.12(p65)
The office building on Kuser Road was the site of one
case of cutaneous anthrax. After extensive environmental
sampling, the only area to produce a positive result was a
mail bin that had likely contained a cross-contaminated
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letter. At this site remediation was restricted to cleaning the
area around where the positive sample was taken.18
USPS Buildings
The greatest amount of remediation was done at USPS
sites. Contaminated letters passed through a number of
post offices and PDCs, which use high-speed mail
sorting machines. Anthrax spores were often spread
when letters passed through these machines. USPS had
to do major remediation at 5 main sites as well as 18
other buildings.
Major decontamination efforts took place at 3 PDCs:
Trenton, Brentwood, and Morgan. The 2 largest sites were
the Trenton and Brentwood PDCs located in New Jersey
and Washington, DC, respectively. At both sites there was
evidence of widespread aerosolizing of anthrax spores,25
and mail workers at both facilities developed inhalation
anthrax.25 The decision was made to do complete fumi-
gations of both buildings with chlorine dioxide. The
complete remediation, including fumigation, took over 2
years and, for both buildings, cost $200 million.2,26
In addition to fumigation and decontamination costs,
remediation at these sites included miscellaneous costs. For
example, $4.5 million was spent busing postal employees
from their usual Brentwood or Trenton workplaces to other
locations while cleanup was happening.27 Additionally,
after the fumigation, USPS spent $10.8 million renovating
the Trenton PDC to refurbish the facility.28 We assume
these expenses are included in the overall remediation costs
of these sites.
The other large PDC to be significantly contaminated
was the Morgan PDC in New York City, which occupies
2.1 million square feet.27 The cleanup at this facility in-
volved closing only a section of the facility for about 2
weeks while decontamination was going on 24 hours a day
at a cost of about $15 million.29
There were 20 other USPS facilities that produced pos-
itive environmental samples.13 Contamination at these sites
was generally low and usually thought to have occurred
through direct physical contact of cross-contaminated let-
ters. Many sites produced just 1 or 2 positive samples, and
in some cases remediation involved cleaning the area of the
room around the positive sample. In some cases, potentially
contaminated items were disposed of.13 According to the
Vice President of Engineering for USPS, ‘‘.15 locations
had very small amounts of contamination. Cleanup pro-
cedures were very limited; closing was generally a 24 to 48
hour time period. Again, no employees at these locations
ever became infected.’’10(p114) Given the extremely low level
of decontamination necessary in these buildings, we con-
struct a lower bound estimate on cost by assuming that no
additional cost was incurred decontaminating these build-
ings (eg, current staff and resources were used to decon-
taminate).
However, we present the data here to illustrate. For these
buildings, per square foot costs are $5.70, $7.14, and
$3.10, respectively. The high variance between these esti-
mates can be explained by several factors; most significant is
the lack of knowledge about the actual area decontami-
nated. In addition, the Department of Justice Mail Facility
was partially fumigated and thus would be expected to have
higher costs.
Cost of Sampling
When the Amerithrax event occurred, the extent of con-
tamination was difficult to ascertain, especially before the
source and route of the bacterium was known. Samples
were taken to discover the extent of exposure, including dry
and wet swab samples and nasal swabs.
At least 10,775 nasal swabs were taken; 33 came back
positive: 2 in Florida, 3 in New York, and 28 on Capitol
Hill. Among those exposed were at least 9 people who
directly handled contaminated letters as well as people
who were in immediate or adjacent proximity to where
letters were handled or opened.30,31 Environmental sam-
ples were also collected by the CDC, EPA, and USPS and
included the sampling of 286 postal facilities.32 Nation-
wide, approximately 120,000 samples were taken, placing
great strain on many laboratories’ ability to process the
samples.32
Environmental samples included both dry and wet wipes
or swabs, HEPA vacuum samples, air quality samples, and
other samples that included control samples used to ensure
the efficacy of fumigation. At the DOJ Mail Facility, dry
samples cost approximately $40 each, while wet samples
were $85 each.5 We assume that HEPA vacuum and air
quality samples as well as ‘‘other’’ type samples also cost $85
each. Sampling performed at 23 USPS sites shows that
about 28% of samples were of the dry type.32 Generalizing
this distribution and multiplying by the respective costs
yields a value of about $8.7 million.
For the purposes of our model, we consider these to be
unique costs and add them to the overall decontamination
costs.
Cost Estimates for Unknown
Buildings
No cost estimate could be obtained for 29 contaminated
buildings. First, we consider the case of GSA 410. The
other 4 completely fumigated buildings showed relatively
consistent costs on a per unit volume basis. GSA 410 has
similar dimensions to and was remediated in the same
manner as Department of State Annex 32. Therefore, we
assume identical decontamination costs ($9 million) for the
2 buildings.
Very little data was available for nonfumigated buildings.
In order to better inform policy decisions, we created an
SCHMITT AND ZACCHIA
BSP-2010-0053-ver9-Schmitt_1P.3d 12/15/11 5:49pm Page 7
Volume 10, Number 1, 2012 7
upper bound, lower bound, and most probable estimate of
these costs. For sites where decontamination was not per-
formed on the entire building, these extrapolations do not
hold, since area contaminated does not necessarily correlate
to building area. We thus estimated costs on a per building
basis.
Costs for the 6 nonfumigated buildings on Capitol
Hill serve as a baseline for an upper bound, both because
we have accurate cost information about them ($2.1
million each) and because they represent nonaerosolized
contamination. If we assume every building had equally
costly remediation, we arrive at a total of about $60
million for unknown buildings. We use a learning factor
of 90% suggested by Wein et al for our most probable
estimate.2 We chose a value of $2.4 million for the first
building remediated on Capitol Hill in order to be
consistent with this learning factor. Applying this
learning factor to the rest of the unknown buildings
yields a cost of $46 million.
Working from the most probable estimate, we then as-
signed zero cost to the last 15 buildings as per Day’s report
that cleanup was very limited.10AU2c This yields a cost of lower
bound estimate of $22 million.
Total Decontamination Cost
of Amerithrax
Decontamination efforts for the Amerithrax event in-
volved varied methods, extensive cost, and efforts that in
some cases took several years, making expenditure
comparisons difficult due to inflation. For reference a
summary has been made of unique decontamination
efforts with all dollar values corrected to 2001 dollars
(T3c Table 3).
Our model indicates that environmental decontami-
nation for the Amerithrax attack cost about $320 million.
If, as discussed under USPS Buildings above, miscella-
neous cleanup costs were not included in fumigation costs
and if no learning occurred between building cleanups,
the overall decontamination costs could be as high as $350
million. On the other hand, if sampling costs are already
accounted for in overall cost summaries and no additional
costs were incurred for 18 mildly contaminated USPS
buildings, overall decontamination costs could be as low
as $290 million.
Discussion
We estimated total cost for building decontamination in
3 ways: we applied an average per building cost to all
buildings, which produces a high estimate; we applied a
learning factor to each successive building decontami-
nation cost, which produces a best guess estimate; and
we produced a low estimate by assuming no additional
cost was incurred in decontaminating 15 mildly con-
taminated USPS buildings. Scaling decontamination
cost by area was not feasible, since the actual deconta-
minated area is not available and decontaminated area is
not related to total building area. Thus, one of the most
significant data gaps (besides per building cost) is the
actual area decontaminated in each affected building.
Further, this limits any potential method for estimating
decontamination costs, including pricing labor and
materials directly. The high degree of variability seen in
existing data might be explained if we were able to as-
certain the actual area decontaminated. Clearly, more
information is needed to fully explain cost variability
and determine whether or not learning occurred. The
private firms affected by the Amerithrax events could
greatly aid policymakers by making their decontami-
nation and cost data available. Based on our investiga-
tion and inquiries, we do not believe more data exist in
government agencies. Although more data would be
useful to track costs and learning, the overall uncer-
tainty in our estimate is far less than an order of mag-
nitude and is unlikely to matter for the purposes of
policy comparison. Nevertheless, one of the most useful
things that could be done in the event of a future bio-
terror attack would be careful and detailed record
keeping on the extent and location of contamination
and costs of decontamination efforts.
While GAO investigated and reported on spending and
cleanup protocols on Capitol Hill and the National Aca-
demies have released a report on future cleanup needs, at
the time of cleanup no official protocols for cleanup existed,
nor does there seem to have been a single agency in charge
of documenting cleanup. This likely contributed to cost
overruns and slowed the process of decontamination.
Moreover, the lack of reporting and data collection com-
plicates efforts to accurately compare economic outlays
associated with the Amerithrax events with the cost of
policy responses.
Table 3. Final Cost Totals for Unique Decontamination
Efforts, Adjusted to 2001 Dollars
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In the months and years following the Amerithrax at-
tacks, pressure was put on government agencies and public
facilities to create contingency plans for dealing with a bi-
ological attack. However, without thorough research and
technical knowledge, some plans fell short of their goals.33
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed
federal guidelines for decontamination protocols in 2009 in
draft form.34 These guidelines do much to address the
uncertainty that hampered decontamination efforts in
2001. Although concerns remain regarding decontamina-
tion of large outdoor spaces, these guidelines are likely to
result in more efficient decontamination in any future
bioterror attack.11
While progress has been made, current decontamination
plans still lack federal standards for cleanup. In particular,
no rule currently states what level of decontamination is
necessary. Without knowing what level to clean facilities to,
future decontamination efforts will naturally be hampered.
Conclusion
This article is part of ongoing research planned to estimate
the total costs associated with the Amerithrax attacks.
Ten years after the anthrax letter attacks, no accurate ac-
counting of the economic impacts associated with that
event exists. While this article focused on the costs associ-
ated with decontamination, we cannot accurately under-
stand the economic impacts associated with the Amerithrax
attacks until similar analyses have been performed for costs
associated with medical expenditures, consumer response,
investigative costs, and prevention, as well as the broader
economic impact using models of economic interaction
(such as input-output) or impacts of business shutdowns or
diversions.
Early estimates of the costs for decontamination var-
ied significantly; initial estimates for Capitol Hill decon-
tamination climbed steadily from $5 million to $28 million
over the 7 months following the attacks (compared to an
actual cost of $27 million) and for USPS as high as $1
billion a year after the attack (compared to our estimated
cost of $320 million for all affected sites). Clearly, initial
policy decisions could be made only on the basis of avail-
able data.4 However, understanding the costs associated
with this event is essential to crafting successful bioterror-
ism policy. Our analysis indicates that the total decon-
tamination costs were under $330 million in 2001 dollars.
A larger attack may well lead to higher levels of decon-
tamination; however, lessons learned from the Amerithrax
attacks, newer technologies and protocols, and economies
of scale would all contribute to a decrease in per unit de-
contamination cost. This analysis demonstrates that de-
contamination costs, at least for an attack of this
magnitude, do not seem likely to be drivers for major
economic impacts.
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